We recognise that executive remuneration generally, and bank remuneration in particular, is an important issue. Barclays needs to work with the acceptance of the communities in which we operate and balance the competing demands of our many stakeholders. This includes a close and continuous engagement with the Financial Services Authority and with our shareholders.
Executive Directors’ total remuneration
|
Bob Diamond |
Chris Lucas |
||
|
2011 |
2010 |
2011 |
2010 |
Salary |
1,350 |
250 |
800 |
763 |
Current year cash bonus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
360 |
Current year share bonus |
0 |
1,800 |
0 |
360 |
Deferred cash bonus |
0 |
2,350 |
0 |
540 |
Deferred share bonus |
2,700 |
2,350 |
1,800 |
540 |
Total of salary and bonus |
4,050 |
6,750 |
2,600 |
2,563 |
Long term incentive award |
2,250 |
2,250 |
1,333 |
1,333 |
Total remuneration |
6,300 |
9,000 |
3,933 |
3,896 |
Non-executive Directors’ fees
|
Chair- man |
Senior Inde- pendent Director |
Board Member |
Board Audit Com- mittee |
Board Remuner- ation Com- mittee |
Board Cor- porate Gover- nance and Nomi- nations Com- mittee |
Board Citizen- ship Com- mittee |
Board Risk Com- mittee |
Benefits |
Total 2011 |
Total 2010 |
||
|
|||||||||||||
Fees at 31 December 2011 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Full-year fee |
750 |
30 |
80 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
||
Committee Chair |
– |
– |
– |
70 |
70 |
– |
– |
60 |
– |
– |
– |
||
Committee Member |
– |
– |
– |
30 |
30 |
15 |
15 |
25 |
– |
– |
– |
||
Fees to 31 December 2011 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Group Chairman |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Marcus Agius |
Ch. |
– |
– |
– |
M. |
Ch. |
Ch. |
– |
1 |
751 |
751 |
||
Non-executive Directors |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
David Booth |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
Ch. |
– |
145 |
125 |
||
Alison Carnwath |
– |
– |
M. |
M. |
Ch. |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
158 |
39 |
||
Fulvio Conti |
– |
– |
M. |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
105 |
95 |
||
Simon Fraser |
– |
– |
M. |
M. |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
– |
130 |
110 |
||
Reuben Jeffery III |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
98 |
85 |
||
Sir Andrew Likierman |
– |
– |
M. |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
127 |
110 |
||
Dambisa Moyo |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
– |
– |
M. |
M. |
– |
105 |
50 |
||
Sir Michael Rake |
– |
SID. |
M. |
Ch. |
– |
M. |
– |
M. |
– |
188 |
160 |
||
Sir John Sunderland |
– |
– |
M. |
– |
M. |
M. |
M. |
– |
– |
132 |
115 |
||
Sir Richard Broadbent |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
171 |
200 |
||
Total incentive awards granted – current year and deferred
|
Barclays Group |
Barclays Capital |
||||
|
Year Ended 31.12.11 |
Year Ended 31.12.10 |
% Change |
Year Ended 31.12.11 |
Year Ended 31.12.10 |
% Change |
Total current year bonus |
898 |
1,674 |
(46) |
384 |
1,196 |
(68) |
Total deferred bonus |
1,252 |
1,177 |
6 |
1,152 |
1,065 |
8 |
Bonus pool |
2,150 |
2,851 |
(25) |
1,536 |
2,261 |
(32) |
Sales commissions, commitments and other incentives |
428 |
633 |
(32) |
201 |
399 |
(50) |
Total incentive awards granted |
2,578 |
3,484 |
(26) |
1,737 |
2,660 |
(35) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bonus pool as % of profit before tax (pre bonus) |
28% |
33% |
|
35% |
36% |
|
Bonus pool as % of adjusted profit before tax (pre bonus) |
29% |
34% |
|
35% |
36% |
|
Proportion of bonus that is deferred |
58% |
41% |
|
75% |
47% |
|
Total employees (full time equivalent) |
141,100 |
147,500 |
(4) |
24,000 |
24,800 |
(3) |
Bonus per employee |
£15,237 |
£19,329 |
(21) |
£64,000 |
£91,169 |
(30) |
Executive Directors’ benefits
|
2011 |
2010 |
Bob Diamond |
474 |
268 |
Chris Lucas |
28 |
25 |
Directors’ emoluments and statutory disclosures
|
2011 |
2010 |
||
|
||||
Aggregate emoluments |
15.9 |
15.8 |
||
Amounts paid under long-term incentive schemes |
5.8 |
7.0 |
||
|
21.7 |
22.8 |
||
Total Shareholder Return
Figure 1 shows the value, at 31 December 2011, of £100 invested in Barclays on 31 December 2006 compared with the value of £100 invested in the FTSE 100 Index. The other points plotted are the values at intervening financial year ends. The FTSE 100 Index is a widely recognised performance comparison for large UK companies and this is why it has been chosen as a comparator to illustrate Barclays total shareholder return.
| Figure 1: Total Shareholder Return | £ |
|---|
Barclays Remuneration Policy
The Remuneration Policy provides a framework for the Committee in carrying out its work. The aims of the Remuneration Policy are to:
- Attract and retain those people with the ability, experience and skill to deliver the strategy;
- Create a direct and recognisable alignment between the rewards and risk exposure of shareholders and employees;
- Incentivise employees to deliver sustained performance consistent with strategic goals and appropriate risk management, and to reward success in this;
- Deliver remuneration that is affordable and appropriate in terms of value allocated to shareholders and employees; and
- Encourage behaviour consistent with Barclays guiding principles.
More details on the Remuneration Policy including Barclays guiding principles can be found on our website. The Committee reviews the Remuneration Policy to ensure that Barclays remuneration remains competitive and provides appropriate incentive for performance. To ensure appropriate operation of the Remuneration Policy, the Committee has established remuneration governance frameworks for each major business and for the Group. The frameworks are forward looking and are based on financial metrics, including key remuneration ratios, that assess the current and future affordability of remuneration. The frameworks are designed to ensure that remuneration is managed in a way that is consistent with delivering the strategy and performance of Barclays and each of the businesses, whilst maintaining capital strength.
For individual remuneration decisions made by the Committee, including the decisions for executive Directors, the level of remuneration across Barclays and each of the businesses is taken into account. The combined potential remuneration for the executive Directors and for senior employees from bonuses and long term incentive awards outweighs the fixed component of remuneration, and is subject to individual and business performance. This means that the majority of remuneration is risk-adjusted.
Remuneration governance
The Committee determines the bonus pool by reference to a number of quantitative and qualitative measures. In doing this the Committee is informed by the remuneration governance frameworks and associated financial metrics and remuneration ratios. The Committee receives input from the Group Finance Director and the Chief Risk Officer on key financial and risk matters. The Committee works closely with the Board Audit Committee and the Board Risk Committee, and receives input on internal audit, compliance and risk matters. This includes the Committee receiving a report from the Board Risk Committee on the risk performance of the businesses in order to ensure that the bonus pool properly reflects this performance.
The Committee reviews individual remuneration recommendations for executive Directors, Code Staff and employees with total remuneration of £1m or more. Remuneration decisions are directly linked to individual performance, both financial and non-financial. Individual performance is reviewed by line management through a formal assessment process, which includes a review against objectives set at the start of the year. The assessment includes reviewing individual behaviour against Barclays guiding principles and applicable risk and control policies.
Bonuses above a threshold level (set annually by the Committee) include awards in the form of deferred bonuses. The vesting of deferred bonuses is dependent on future service and subject to clawback provisions. The Committee reviews the operation of clawback provisions and may reduce the vesting level of an unvested deferred bonus (including to nil).
The risk and compliance functions play a key role in remuneration governance. The risk function provides regular updates to the Committee on risk-adjusted business performance and it also provides input on the remuneration governance frameworks, bonus pool proposals and new incentive plan designs (including risk-adjusted metrics for use in long term incentive plans) from a risk management perspective. The input of the compliance function focuses on the assessment of individual employee behaviour based on the operation of compliance controls.
